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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine your most recent visit to one of America’s breathtaking 
national parks.  While enjoying the stunning landscape and the smell 
of fresh air, you notice something in the distance.  Bolted and 
chained to a set of large boulders stands what looks like an 
abandoned wooden billboard in the middle of a pristine landscape.  
Intrigued, you climb a small rock outcropping to get a better look at 
this square six-foot-tall plank of wood.  After arriving, you notice the 
remnants of a small wooden sign that reads:  “Erected in Memory of 
the Dead of All Wars.”1 
Confused?  If your answer is yes, many visitors to the Mojave 
National Preserve would most likely agree.  The billboard-like 
structure on the Preserve is actually a Latin cross erected in 1934.2   
In 2007, after the Ninth Circuit determined that the symbol 
constituted government endorsement of religion and was therefore 
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause, the cross was 
covered with a plywood box pending resolution of the case.3 
A constitutional controversy regarding a cross on public land is not 
uncharted territory in the Ninth Circuit or other courts across the 
country.4  Indeed, the land that religious symbols occupy has proved 
                                                          
 1. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and 
reh’g denied by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom., Salazar v. Buono, 
129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (describing past signs posted on the Mojave cross);  
see also Steve Brown, Faith Under Fire in the Desert, THE SUN RUNNER, Dec. 2006– 
Jan. 2007, available at http://www.thesunrunner.com/Stories/Faith_Under_Fire_in_ 
the_Desert/faith_under_fire_in_the_desert.html (recounting the history of the 
memorial that the cross intends to commemorate). 
 2. Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2009).   
For pictures of the cross in its current condition and in its unaltered state prior to 
the court’s involvement, see The Mojave Cross Christian Church Website, 
http://mojavecrosschristianchurch.com/cgi-bin/photoalbum/view_album/160040 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2009). 
 3. Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 769. 
 4. See, e.g., Separation of Church & State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 
619 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a fifty-one-foot high Latin cross in a city park 
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to be a common constitutional battleground in courts across the 
country.5  The present dispute turns on whether the sale of a parcel 
of land occupied by a cross constitutes a valid remedy for an 
Establishment Clause violation.6  Two circuit courts of appeals have 
taken differing analytical approaches,7 and the Supreme Court is 
prepared to hear arguments.8 
This Comment argues that courts should not adopt a presumption 
of validity in favor of the government when determining whether 
land transfers have remedied a violation of the Establishment Clause.  
The risks of continuing government action through manipulation of 
property designations necessitate more searching judicial review than 
the limited presumption test currently provides. 
Part I of this Comment explores the development of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence in the context of the display of religious 
symbols while tracking the Court’s manipulation of property 
designations as proposed remedies in other constitutional contexts.  
                                                          
constituted government endorsement of Christianity regardless of the builders’ 
intent to honor war veterans); Carpenter v. City of San Francisco, 93 F.3d 627,  
630–32 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the city’s ownership of a large cross in public 
park violated the “no preference” clause of the California Constitution due to the 
symbol’s prominent location and significant religious meaning); Am. Jewish  
Cong. v. City of Beverly Hills, 90 F.3d 379, 384–85 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a city’s 
arbitrary policy that permitted the construction of a twenty-seven-foot menorah on 
public property but denied an application to erect a Latin cross on the same 
property). 
 5. See generally Kong v. City of San Francisco, 18 F. App’x 616 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(challenging the auction of a parcel of public land containing a religious symbol); 
Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518 (9th Cir. 1993) (disputing displays of Latin 
crosses on the city and county seal as well as in public parks); Southside Fair Hous. 
Comm. v. City of New York, 928 F.2d 1336 (2d Cir. 1991) (calling into question the 
city’s sale of land to a Hasidic congregation); Trunk v. City of San Diego,  
568 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (resisting the government’s taking of a 
memorial site by eminent domain and the placement of a cross on the property for 
operation by a civic organization); Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 
567 (D. Md. 2005) (contesting the sale to a private organization of a parcel of a city 
park on which a Ten Commandments monument sits); Murphy v. Bilbray,  
No. 90-134 GT, 1997 WL 754604 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1997) (confronting, under the 
Establishment Clause, a private organization’s purchase of a fifteen-square-foot 
parcel containing a thirty-five-foot cross). 
 6. Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 768. 
 7. Compare Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007), amended 
and reh’g denied by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom., Salazar v. 
Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009), with Freedom from Religion Found. v. City of 
Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 8. See Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009).  Aside from its relevance to the 
particular issue of land transfers, commentators such as Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky view the case as potentially having a broader impact on Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence.  See David G. Savage, Desert Cross May Lead to Landmark  
Church-State Ruling, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, at A8 (commenting that the Supreme 
Court’s current makeup could result in the restriction of Establishment Clause 
violations to the government’s literal establishment of a church or coercion of 
religious participation). 
  
132 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:129 
Part I also examines the history of the Mojave cross and presents the 
conflicting analytical frameworks of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.  
Part II argues that the present framework is too lenient when it 
comes to permitting land transfers and that failure to apply more 
searching scrutiny ignores the potential for continued government 
violations of the Establishment Clause.  Part II also reasons that, when 
viewed in light of the Supreme Court’s response to defective 
desegregation plans and the use of a state official’s illegally obtained 
evidence in federal proceedings, the proposed land transfer remedy 
is merely the latest example of the government’s preservation of an 
unconstitutional result through seemingly lawful property-based 
means. 
Finally, Part III proposes an abandonment of the presumption 
standard and a return to the Court’s original (but oft-criticized) 
Establishment Clause test outlined in Lemon v. Kurtzman.9  Consistent 
with the Court’s reasoning in the desegregation and Fourth 
Amendment contexts, this test would work in two important ways.  
First, it would require that the proposed transaction have a secular 
purpose.  Second, it would assure that the change in ownership does 
not yield a potentially unconstitutional effect in advancing or 
endorsing religion.  In addition, analysis through the Lemon lens 
would rightfully shift the focus of a court’s analysis back to the true 
question at hand:  whether an Establishment Clause violation persists 
in substance regardless of a change in form.  Unlike the Seventh 
Circuit’s presumption, an analysis in line with the First Amendment 
itself would help streamline an unpredictable line of cases while also 
addressing the danger of government actors circumventing a court 
injunction. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The use of land transfers to remedy Establishment Clause 
violations evades rather than honors the First Amendment’s 
requirement that the government abstain from the endorsement or 
establishment of religion.10  Remedies for violations of the 
Establishment Clause must be properly and uniquely tailored to fully 
correct the infraction.11  Two artifacts of Supreme Court history, 
                                                          
 9. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
 10. See infra Part II.B. 
 11. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 629 (1988) (noting a court’s broad 
scope in remedying constitutional violations); see also Susan Gellman & Susan 
Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal Protection Clause for Religion Cases  
(Not Just the Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 732–33 (2008)  
(arguing that the appropriate remedy in an equal protection approach to litigating 
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faulty desegregation plans after the second installment of Brown v. 
Board of Education and the emergence of the “silver platter doctrine” 
in contravention of protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures,12 illustrate the Court’s refusal to permit the ongoing 
manipulation of constitutional rights. 
A. Religious Displays Under the Establishment Clause 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion.”13  Whether it is in the interest of preserving religion from 
contamination by the state or guarding the state from government-
sponsored indoctrination, our nation’s history evidences a  
long-standing interest in the separation of church and state.14   
While the necessity of this tradition is universally recognized, the 
means of evaluating such separation has undergone extensive 
inquiry.15  The multitude of tests set forth in modern Supreme Court 
doctrine represents what one court has described as a kind of 
“jurisprudential schizophrenia.”16 
                                                          
Establishment Clause controversies will not always be inclusion of additional religious 
symbols, but will depend on the circumstances of each individual case). 
 12. See infra note 57. 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 14. Compare LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:  RELIGION AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 249 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1994) (1986) (claiming the need for 
separation between the “garden of the church and the wilderness of the world” so 
that “His garden and paradise” may be restored (quoting Roger Williams,  
Mr. Cotton’s Letter Lately Printed, Examined and Answered (1644) reprinted in  
1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 392 (Perry Miller ed., Russell & 
Russell, Inc. 1963))), with Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist 
Association (Jan. 1, 1802) (on file with the Thomas Jefferson Papers at the Library of 
Congress), available at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/danburys.jpg (stating 
that “religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God” that requires 
“building a wall of separation between church and State”).  In its first modern 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court echoed this 
separationist language when it enumerated the activities prohibited under the First 
Amendment.  See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (commenting 
that “[t]he ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least 
this:  Neither can a state nor the Federal Government . . . pass laws which aid one 
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. . . .  No person can be 
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church 
attendance or non-attendance. . . .  In the words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between 
Church and State.’” (internal citation omitted)). 
 15. See LEVY, supra note 14, at 206 (recognizing that litigation over publicly 
sponsored religious symbols has produced conflicting interpretations of the 
Establishment Clause by forming sharp divisions on the Court). 
 16. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 717  
(9th Cir. 1999).  One commentator argues that each test the Supreme Court 
“concoct[s]” is as misguided as the previous one because they have all failed to 
address the true historical reality behind the enactment of the Establishment Clause.  
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The Court’s initial test for evaluating the constitutionality of 
religious displays was set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.17  Under this 
three-part test, displays passed constitutional scrutiny as long as they 
(1) had a secular purpose, (2) did not have the primary effect of 
advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) did not promote any 
“excessive government entanglement with religion.”18  This test 
symbolized a dramatic shift from the Court’s prior perspectives of the 
role of religion in American society.19  Perhaps for this reason, the 
Lemon test has faced scrutiny for its nearly categorical rejection of 
religion and its inconsistency in application.20 
Out of this sometimes contradictory doctrine sprang new 
experimentation in evaluating public religious displays.21  In Lynch v. 
Donnelly,22 the Court charted a different course by electing to adopt a 
more permissive test for interpreting the Establishment Clause.23   
As part of an influential concurrence, Justice O’Connor employed an 
“endorsement test” in finding that the display of a crèche did not 
constitute an establishment of religion.24  She reasoned that allegedly 
religious displays only violate the Establishment Clause when a 
reasonable person would understand that the symbol evokes 
government endorsement of religion.25  Like Lemon, the endorsement 
test has also faced significant—though very different—scrutiny from 
within the Court26 and from various commentators.27 
                                                          
BARRY ADAMSON, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE SUPREME 
COURT:  HOW THE COURT FLUNKED HISTORY 241 (2008). 
 17. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  See generally Stephen M. Feldman, Critical Questions in 
Law and Religion:  An Introduction, in LAW AND RELIGION:  A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 2 
(Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000). 
 18. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 19. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (claiming that the 
citizens of the United States “are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a 
Supreme Being”). 
 20. See PATRICK M. GARRY, WRESTLING WITH GOD:  THE COURTS’ TORTUOUS 
TREATMENT OF RELIGION 56 (2006) (detailing the Court’s erratic application of Lemon 
to approve a state’s provision of hearing devices to parochial school students while 
striking down the state’s administration of remedial instruction to the same group). 
 21. See id. at 57 (highlighting two of the Court’s experimental approaches,  
the coercion test and the neutrality approach). 
 22. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 23. See id. at 674 (describing the “unbroken history” of religion as part of 
American life beginning in 1789); see also GARRY, supra note 20, at 68 (praising Lynch 
for its recognition that the Lemon analysis was hostile towards religion); LEVY, supra 
note 14, at 206 (asserting that Lynch “lowered the wall of separation between church 
and state” by permitting the display of a religious symbol in a public space). 
 24. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing the endorsement test as 
unworkable and flawed due to its disregard for religion’s historical significance in 
the American tradition); see also id. at 593–94 (concluding that the principle of 
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Nonetheless, the endorsement test has remained the predominant 
standard for the evaluation of violations under the Establishment 
Clause28 until—in typical contradictory fashion—the Court decided 
Van Orden v. Perry29 and McCreary County v. ACLU.30  In McCreary 
County, a majority of the Court employed the Lemon test to invalidate 
two displays of the Ten Commandments on courthouse property.31  
After the ACLU’s initial challenge, the Kentucky counties made 
efforts on two separate occasions to secularize their display through 
the inclusion of other documents and messages rather than remove it 
as directed under the already-issued preliminary injunction.32   
The Court reasoned that the original displays, as well as the attempts 
to make them more secular, did not demonstrate a secular purpose.33 
However, the Van Orden plurality upheld the display of the Ten 
Commandments on the Texas State Capitol on the grounds of the 
monument’s “historical role.”34  The display on government land was 
situated among numerous other monuments and statues 
commemorating “Texan identity.”35  Ignoring Lemon, the Court 
embraced the structure as a “passive monument,” acknowledging the 
strong role religion has played throughout the country’s history.36  
These rulings complicate the question of when (and whether) to 
apply Lemon, but also introduce yet another factor to consider when 
faced with similar controversies:  the history and tradition of 
governmental acknowledgement of religion.37 
                                                          
“endorsement” set forth in Lynch is a mere continuation of the privileges against 
religious “favoritism” and “promotion” that the Lemon test aims to counteract) 
(majority opinion). 
 27. See GARRY, supra note 20, at 68 (critiquing the endorsement test’s 
disproportionate focus on emotional responses to religious symbols rather than 
constitutional doctrine). 
 28. Id. at 57. 
 29. 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 30. 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 31. Id. at 868–89. 
 32. See id. at 852–57 (recounting the Kentucky Legislature’s authorization of 
displays of the Ten Commandments as long as they included the posting of the 
Magna Carta, the lyrics to the Star-Spangled Banner, and other documents that 
made up “The Foundations of American Law and Government Display”). 
 33. See id. at 871–72 (refusing to accept the claim that a reasonable citizen would 
look at the more secular collection of symbols independently of the original, overtly 
religious display). 
 34. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690. 
 35. See id. at 681 (quoting H. Con. Res. 38, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001)). 
 36. Id. at 677–78. 
 37. Compare McCreary Country, 545 U.S. at 861–62 (reinforcing a court’s need to 
look at the “purpose” inquiry of Lemon in the Establishment Clause context),  
with Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686–87 (questioning the greater significance of the Lemon 
test and instead opting to analyze the Establishment Clause issue in light of the 
monument’s history and tradition). 
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B. Unconstitutional Responses to Desegregation and the  
Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule 
Confusion as to the continued viability of constitutional doctrine is 
certainly not unique to Establishment Clause jurisprudence.38   
The enforcement of school desegregation plans and the introduction 
of illegally obtained evidence in federal court are analogous to the 
proposed land transfer remedy due to the federal government’s 
unique use of physical property to manipulate another party not 
bound by the same limits to achieve unconstitutional aims.39   
Perhaps more importantly, these two pieces of Supreme Court history 
illustrate the Court’s tradition of recognizing and remedying 
seemingly inconsistent outcomes and government manipulation. 
1. Faulty desegregation plans and the evasion of “deliberate speed” 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which  
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”40  As stated in the landmark case of Brown v. 
Board of Education (Brown I),41 segregated public school systems are 
“inherently unequal” and violate the Fourteenth Amendment.42   
The Court in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II) ordered that the 
desegregation of these unconstitutional binary school systems be 
effectuated “with all deliberate speed”43 and under the direction of 
local district courts in the interest of making each district’s transition 
as site-specific as possible.44  Unfortunately, by adopting measures that 
failed to firmly implement the ruling of Brown I in public school 
systems, Brown II permitted unconstitutional segregated school 
systems to persist.45 
                                                          
 38. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (allowing the use of 
statements at trial for impeachment purposes even though they had been obtained 
in violation of Miranda). 
 39. See infra Part II.B.2 (comparing the federal government’s control over 
property through its use of state officials by way of the exclusionary rule, local school 
officials in the desegregation context, and private individuals through the land 
transfer remedy in response to an Establishment Clause violation). 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 42. Id. at 493–95 (reasoning that the important benefit of education in modern 
society, as well as the adverse effects segregation inflicted on African-American 
youths, mandated the provision of an integrated school system). 
 43. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 44. Id. at 299 (“Because of [the district courts’] proximity to local conditions and 
the possible need for further hearings, the [district] courts which originally heard 
these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal.”). 
 45. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 85 (2007) (“The Court approved gradualism, imposed no deadlines for 
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Desegregation plans across the country produced only token 
integration and almost completely diluted the “deliberate speed” 
standard.46  However, in Griffin v. County School Board47 the Court 
responded, concluding that “[t]here has been entirely too much 
deliberation and not enough speed” in instituting unitary school 
systems.48  Desegregation plans were not meant to be lazy endeavors, 
but rather “quick and effective” relief.49 
The facts in Griffin epitomize the continuing segregation that 
Brown I attempted to eradicate but permitted through its adoption of 
the “deliberate speed” standard prior to 1964.50  Officials in Prince 
Edward County, Virginia refused to levy school taxes for the  
1959–1960 school year based on their opposition to a unitary school 
system, leaving the county’s schools closed from 1959 until 1963.51  
While the public schools were closed, the county provided tuition 
grants and other subsidies to those students attending private, white 
schools.52  In holding that the complete closure of public schools in 
Prince Edward County denied African-American children equal 
protection of the law, the Court focused on the net effect of the 
school’s response to Brown I.53  The Court refused to permit a transfer 
of public schooling responsibilities to private hands when the 
resulting social implications so blatantly contradicted Brown I.54 
Griffin signaled the beginning of a period in which the Court 
refused to tolerate manipulation of the public-private distinction to 
                                                          
beginning or completing desegregation, issued vague guidelines, and entrusted 
(southern) district judges with broad discretion.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Kelley v. Bd. of Educ., 270 F.2d 209, 213–15 (6th Cir. 1959) 
(describing a school plan that allowed students to transfer from a school where their 
racial group was in the minority, thereby ensuring segregation of schools). 
 47. 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
 48. Id. at 229. 
 49. Id. at 232. 
 50. See Charles Ogletree, All Too Deliberate, in THE UNFINISHED AGENDA OF BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION 45, 49–50 (James Anderson & Dara N. Byrne eds., 2004) 
(recounting that a mere two years after Brown I, a large southern delegation that 
included representatives from Alabama, Virginia, and Georgia formed a “Southern 
Manifesto” to subvert the decision and keep schools segregated through state and 
local enactments as well as unofficial funding). 
 51. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 222–23.  One commentator remarked that, “[b]y 1964, 
Prince Edward County had become a national and international embarrassment,  
as 1,700 black youngsters went largely uneducated for several years.”  KLARMAN,  
supra note 45, at 102. 
 52. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 221. 
 53. See id. at 231 (“[T]he record in the present case could not be clearer that 
Prince Edward’s public schools were closed . . . to ensure . . . that white and colored 
children in Prince Edward County would not, under any circumstances, go to the 
same school.”). 
 54. See id. (“Whatever nonracial grounds might support a State’s allowing a 
county to abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional one, and 
grounds of race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional.”). 
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justify untimely desegregation.55  Although Brown II’s porous 
“deliberate speed” standard allowed school districts to evade Brown I’s 
desegregation requirement, the Supreme Court recognized and 
attempted to counter this doctrinal deficiency.56 
2. Fourth Amendment protections and the “silver platter doctrine” 
Like the responses of some school districts to Brown I, the  
“silver platter doctrine”57 presented the Court with attempted stealth 
encroachments to constitutional rights.  The Fourth Amendment 
protects individuals from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”58   
In Weeks v. United States,59 the Court articulated its landmark 
exclusionary rule, which prohibited the use of evidence obtained in 
violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights in federal 
proceedings.60  The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule was 
necessary in order to prevent the complete devaluation of vital 
Fourth Amendment rights.61 
While Weeks did much to limit Fourth Amendment abuses, the 
Court placed firm limitations on the reach of this new evidentiary 
rule by definitively announcing that suppression applied only to 
evidence unlawfully obtained by federal officials.62  The Weeks court 
                                                          
 55. See, e.g., United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484,  
490–91 (1972) (holding that the school board’s fear that white students will leave 
public school for private and suburban schools does not justify postponement of 
compliance with school desegregation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1971) (finding that a seemingly neutral plan assigning a 
student to the school nearest to her home is not acceptable because its overall effect 
may not achieve racial integration); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 396 U.S. 1215, 1217 
(1969) (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)) (denying the school district’s 
claim that developing public support was necessary before implementing 
desegregation plan). 
 56. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 467 (1973) (finding that a state 
program that lent textbooks to private segregated schools was unconstitutional 
because the state may not provide financial aid to institutions practicing racial 
discrimination). 
 57. See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949) (coining the phrase  
“silver platter” to refer to the interplay between state and federal agents in the use of 
illegally obtained evidence).  Specifically, the “silver platter doctrine” permitted 
otherwise-excludable evidence to be served up on a silver platter to prosecutors in 
federal proceedings in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
 58. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 59. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 60. See id. at 391–93 (implying that the Fourth Amendment protects against the 
federal government’s abuse of power). 
 61. See id. at 393 (affirming that while efforts to bring criminals to justice should 
be lauded, they should not be accomplished “by the sacrifice of those great 
principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their 
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land”). 
 62. See id. at 398 (concluding that the Court could not prescribe a remedy in 
relation to the local policeman’s misconduct because the Fourth Amendment does 
not apply to non-federal officials). 
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reasoned that state and local officials were not subject to the same 
constraints because the Fourth Amendment was designed to 
encompass only the federal government and its agencies.63  
Therefore, when federal agents were not involved in the unlawful 
acquisition of evidence, the exclusionary rule would not apply.64 
After Weeks, the Court began the process of eroding this bright-line 
exception.  In Byars v. United States,65 the Court excluded evidence 
where an officer’s search “in substance and effect was a joint 
operation of the local and federal officers.”66  Another 1927 decision, 
Gambino v. United States,67 focused on the nexus between the federal 
purpose and the state officers’ search.68  The Court had come so far 
as to say that, even when state agents had not acted specifically under 
the direction of—or in cooperation with—their federal counterparts, 
the use of illegally obtained evidence was unlawful when the seizure 
occurred “solely on behalf of the United States.”69 
Regardless of the holdings in Byars and Gambino, the central tenets 
of Weeks held firm.70  It was not until Wolf v. Colorado,71 that a 
unanimous Court found, by incorporation through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, that “[t]he security of one’s privacy against arbitrary 
intrusion by the police . . . [is] implicit in ‘the concept of ordered 
liberty’ and . . . enforceable against the States through the Due 
Process Clause.”72 
Though lower courts disagreed over the significance of this 
finding,73 the Court would later put the final nail in the silver platter 
                                                          
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 273 U.S. 28 (1927). 
 66. Id. at 33. 
 67. 275 U.S. 310 (1927). 
 68. See id. at 315 (“[The] facts . . . make it clear that the state troopers believed 
that they were required by law to aid in enforcing the National Prohibition Act,  
and that they made this arrest, search, and seizure, in the performance of that 
supposed duty, solely for the purpose of aiding in the federal prosecution.”). 
 69. Id. at 312, 314–15. 
 70. Until 1949, illegally obtained evidence was excluded from federal 
proceedings when federal officers procured it or took a somewhat active role in 
obtaining it alongside state officers.  Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 212–13 
(1960).  Courts did not exclude such evidence when state officials provided it of their 
own accord for federal prosecutions.  Id. 
 71. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
 72. Id. at 27–28. 
 73. Compare Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723, 726–28 (D.C. Cir. 1958) 
(concluding that Wolf’s proscription of evidence obtained through unconstitutional 
searches and seizures by state officials under the Fourth Amendment nullified the 
distinction set forth in Weeks between federal and state agents), with Burford v. 
United States, 214 F.2d 124, 125 (5th Cir. 1954) (refusing to suppress evidence in 
federal court obtained through an unauthorized search and seizure by state officials 
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doctrine’s coffin in Elkins v. United States.74  Relying on the Court’s 
incorporation of the Fourth Amendment in Wolf,75 the Court 
ultimately held that personal property obtained by any officer—state 
or federal—was inadmissible in federal court if the defendant’s right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated.76   
Notably, the Court acknowledged the state’s interest in promoting 
collaboration of all levels of law enforcement,77 but refused to 
acknowledge the silver platter doctrine as a valid exercise of that 
interest.78  By masking the identity of those seizing personal property, 
officials of all levels were not working under the Constitution, but in 
spite of it.79 
C. The Mojave Cross:  From the Desert to the Courtroom 
1. The installation and maintenance of the Mojave cross 
The Mojave National Preserve is a primarily federally-owned tract 
of desert land spanning some 1.6 million acres.80  The park was 
originally under the control of the Bureau of Land Management,  
but in 1994 the Bureau transferred ownership and the responsibility 
of maintaining the Preserve to the National Park Service.81 
On top of a stone outcropping called Sunrise Rock, along Cima 
Road in the Mojave National Preserve, stands the most recent 
installment of the five-foot-tall cross.82  A prospector named J. Riley 
Bembry and a group of World War I veterans were the first to fasten 
                                                          
because, under Gambino, there was no collaboration or participation with federal 
officials). 
 74. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
 75. See id. at 213 (stating that Wolf’s inclusion of state searches under the 
Constitution directly contradicted the rationale that once justified the admission of 
state-seized evidence in federal court). 
 76. Id. at 223.  The Court’s decision was largely based on federalism grounds.   
See id. at 221 (reasoning that, in states that have adopted the exclusionary rule, the 
admission of unlawfully obtained evidence in federal court from the work of state 
officials frustrates the state’s ability to set policy and honor its obligations under the 
Federal Constitution). 
 77. Id. at 221. 
 78. See id. at 221–22 (refusing to endorse cooperation that gives rise to the 
erosion of constitutional rights). 
 79. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658 (1961) (citing Miller v. United States, 
357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958)) (postulating that requiring federal and state officials to 
observe the same constitutional standards in the prosecution of a crime will increase 
rather than hinder their effectiveness). 
 80. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and reh’g 
denied by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom., Salazar v. Buono,  
129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009). 
 81. Richard Lake, That Old Rugged Cross, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 15, 2002, at 1B, 
available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2002/Dec-15-Sun-2002/news/ 
20274896.html. 
 82. Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 527 F.3d 758, 768 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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the cross atop Sunrise Rock in 1934.83  Since then, the structure has 
been modified and replaced several times.84  Bembry and his fellow 
veterans originally erected the cross to memorialize the sacrifice of 
fallen soldiers.85  They also placed wooden signs near the cross 
expressing this purpose.86  Over time, however, community members 
began using the cross as a site for sunrise services on Easter Sunday.87 
2. The involvement of Congress and the courts 
Prior to May 1999, the cross at Sunrise Rock garnered little 
attention from either the National Park Service or the Bureau of 
Land Management.88  However, the spark that ignited the ensuing 
legal firestorm involved a request to build another religious symbol—
a Buddhist stupa—near the cross.89  In denying this request, the Park 
Service acknowledged the existence of the Mojave cross and 
expressed its intention to remove it.90  Perhaps also feeling pressure 
from the ACLU,91 the Park Service initiated a study of the cross’s 
history to determine whether it could be designated in the National 
Register for Historic Places.92  The study concluded that, regardless of 
its commemorative value, the cross’s previous religious use precluded 
it from being classified as a historical site.93 
Largely under the direction of Representative Jerry Lewis,94 
Congress responded by passing two separate appropriations bills in 
                                                          
 83. Lake, supra note 81, at 1B. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Alliance Defense Fund, ADF to 9th Circuit:  Mojave Land Transfer Was Legal, 
Uncover That Cross, Apr. 9, 2007, http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/news/ 
story.aspx?cid=4067. 
 86. Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 769. 
 87. Lake, supra note 81, at 1B. 
 88. Brown, supra note 1.  To some, the battle over the preservation of this 
Christian symbol is the “quintessential example” of the Bush administration’s stamp 
on the Justice Department in promoting what one group calls the “Faith-based Parks” 
initiative.  See Press Release, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, 
Justice Department Undercuts Park System for Mojave Cross (Jan. 24, 2008), 
http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=976 (noting that the Mojave legal 
battle has endured for the duration of Bush’s presidency).  See generally Public 
Employees for Environmental Responsibility, Faith-based Parks:  News Releases, 
http://www.peer.org/campaigns/earlier/faith-based/news.php (last visited Sept. 28, 
2009) (cataloguing the actions taken by the Bush administration). 
 89. Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 769. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Lake, supra note 81, at 1B (reporting that the ACLU threatened to sue if 
the cross was not removed from Sunrise Rock). 
 92. Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 769. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Julie Cart, Lawmaker Seeks Land Swap to Let Mojave Cross Stand, L.A. TIMES,  
Oct. 18, 2002, at 6. 
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an attempt to preserve the cross.95  At the same time, the ACLU 
initiated a suit on behalf of a former park employee to have the cross 
removed.96  In July 2002, the Central District of California ruled in 
favor of the ACLU and entered a permanent injunction requiring the 
removal of the cross.97 
Before the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling in June 
2004,98 Congress enacted a third appropriations bill in September 
2003 which included terms for a land exchange between the United 
States, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and Henry and Wanda Sandoz, 
a couple that had played an active part in preserving the symbol.99  
This exchange called for the conveyance of a one-acre parcel of the 
Mojave National Preserve and for the maintenance of the site as a 
national memorial.100  In return, the government received a parcel of 
land from the cross’s current curator, Mr. Henry Sandoz.  
Additionally, the exchange provided the federal government with 
certain reversionary rights conditioned upon a finding by the 
Secretary of the Interior that the new landowners were not 
maintaining the land according to the government’s stipulations.101 
Despite the circuit court affirming the injunction, the government 
continued its pursuit of the land exchange.102  In 2005, the ACLU 
                                                          
 95. See Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for 
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137, 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79 (2002) (codified at 16 U.S.C.  
§ 410aaa-56 note (2006)) (establishing the cross as a national memorial); 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 133, 114 Stat. 2763,  
2763A-230 (2000) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 461 note (2001)) (restricting the use of 
federal funds to remove the cross).  Some critics of the transfer claim that 
Representative Lewis’s attempts are part of a larger scheme to politicize the National 
Park Service.  See Michael Janofsky, Critics Say the Park Service Is Letting Religion and 
Politics Affect Its Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at N16  (describing recent orders in 
Grand Canyon National Park and at the Lincoln Memorial as evidence of 
conservative interest groups penetrating the policy of the National Park Service as 
part of the Bush administration’s faith-based initiatives). 
 96. Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 770; see Lake, supra note 81, at 1B (recounting the 
National Park Service’s employment of Frank Buono from 1994 until his retirement 
in 1997). 
 97. Buono v. Norton (Buono I), 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1215–17 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 98. Buono v. Norton (Buono II), 371 F.3d 543, 548–50 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 99. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87,  
§ 8121(a)–(f), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100 (2003) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 note 
(2006)) (outlining the transfer of a parcel of land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in 
exchange for land previously owned by Mr. and Mrs. Henry Sandoz); Lake,  
supra note 81, 1B (recounting Henry Sandoz’s relationship to the cross’s creator and 
commitment to maintaining the structure). 
 100. § 8121(a). 
 101. § 8121(e). 
 102. Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 502 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007), 
amended and reh’g denied by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom.,  
Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009). 
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moved to enforce the injunction.103  The Central District of California 
held that the land transfer appeared to selectively honor only the 
fallen soldiers of a particular religion and was “an attempt by the 
government to evade the permanent injunction.”104  When it came 
time for the Ninth Circuit to review the district court’s latest 
determination in this third installment of litigation, the Seventh 
Circuit’s prior decisions provided the blueprint from which the Ninth 
Circuit would craft its decision.105 
D. The Circuit Split:  Contrasting Applications of the  
“Unusual Circumstances” Test 
The Seventh Circuit set forth the original test for evaluating the 
land transfer remedy in Freedom from Religion Foundation v. City of 
Marshfield.106  This test adopts a presumption in favor of the 
government’s sale of land to a private entity.107  In order to rebut this 
presumption, the plaintiff must show “unusual circumstances” where 
the substance of the transaction still yields government endorsement 
of religion.108  The “circumstances” that may surmount the 
government’s presumption of validity include a sale in violation of 
state law,109 a sale to a straw purchaser,110 a sale well below fair-market 
value,111 a sale of property “inextricably linked with the seat of 
government,”112 and the sale of property placed prominently in the 
public community.113 
This test favors the transfer while also acknowledging specific 
factual nuances through a case-by-case analysis.114  The court justified 
the presumption of a transaction’s validity due to the Constitution’s 
                                                          
 103. Buono v. Norton (Buono III), 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 104. Id. at 1182. 
 105. See Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 527 F.3d 758, 778–79 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(describing the factual background and rationale of the Seventh Circuit decisions 
regarding land transfers and its test that purports to evaluate a transaction based on 
its form and substance). 
 106. 203 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 107. Id. at 491. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 492. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 113. See id. (noting that the monument is not prominently placed within the 
context of the park and the sale of land is therefore not a serious constitutional 
threat); see also Freedom from Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 
494 (7th Cir. 2000) (considering the orientation and location of a statue of Jesus 
Christ in evaluating whether the symbol violates the Establishment Clause). 
 114. See Freedom from Religion Found., 203 F.3d at 491 (requiring courts to “look to 
the substance of the transaction as well as its form to determine whether government 
action endorsing religion has actually ceased”). 
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contrasting treatment of religious speech depending on the identity 
of the speaker.115  Because of the danger in potentially limiting private 
speech, the Seventh Circuit viewed the land transfer as not only a 
complete transfer of title, but also a transfer of expression.116 
In considering the land exchange, the Ninth Circuit employed its 
own interpretation of the Seventh Circuit’s test to achieve a very 
different result.117  In its amended opinion, the court agreed in 
principle with the need for a fact-based inquiry118 but refused to adopt 
the Seventh Circuit’s same presumption of validity.119  The Ninth 
Circuit found continuing state action based on the government’s 
ongoing maintenance of the cross after the transfer, the manner of 
exchange and bidding, and insistence in preserving the symbol 
itself.120  The court reasoned that Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
and the Supreme Court’s public function cases require that courts 
conduct a purely fact-specific inquiry to guard against continuing 
government action and state endorsement of religion.121 
II. A PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY FAILS TO ADDRESS THE POTENTIAL 
FOR CONTINUING STATE ACTION AND THE EVASION OF A  
VALID CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY 
In order to counteract the Seventh Circuit’s presumption test, 
there must be a finding of “unusual circumstances.”122 However, the 
current standard of qualifying “circumstances” fails to address subtle 
governmental intrusion like that in Buono.  As a result, government 
involvement in religious displays slips through the porous cracks in 
the Seventh Circuit’s framework.  Without safeguards, the 
government’s proposed transfer receives the functional equivalent of 
per se approval.  The practical result of the government’s use of land 
transfers echoes a tradition of attempting to circumvent Supreme 
                                                          
 115. See id. (“[T]here is a ‘crucial difference between government speech endorsing 
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing 
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.’” (quoting Bd. of 
Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990))). 
 116. Id. at 491. 
 117. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and 
reh’g denied by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom., Salazar v. Buono, 
129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009). 
 118. Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 527 F.3d 758, 759, 779 n.13  
(9th Cir. 2009). 
 119. See id. (advocating for a more searching review of proposed land transfer 
remedies in light of the remedy’s potential impact on the Establishment Clause). 
 120. Id. at 783. 
 121. Id. at 779 n.13. 
 122. Freedom from Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491  
(7th Cir. 2000). 
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Court precedent using property designations as instruments for 
furthering unconstitutional effects. 
A. The Weaknesses of the Exceptions in the Seventh Circuit’s  
“Unusual Circumstances” Test 
The Seventh Circuit’s test requires looking beyond the mere form 
of the land transaction and accounting for its true substance in 
determining whether there is continuing state action.123  Specifically, 
it requires that the terms of transfer meet a particular checklist of 
conditions in order to rebut the presumption attached to the 
transaction.124 
Concededly, it is possible that procedural steps in approving a 
municipality’s land conveyance, as well as the price at which the land 
is sold, may weed out egregious examples of continuing state 
action.125  However, mere price-setting and bureaucratic procedures 
may, in effect, fail to place all prospective purchasers on equal 
footing.126  To illustrate, the Ninth Circuit has previously provided this 
example: 
Suppose that two similarly situated bidders—Bidder # 1 and Bidder 
# 2—each had the minimum acceptable amount of $35,000 to bid 
on the project, and Bidder # 1 proposed to retain the cross, while 
Bidder # 2 proposed to construct a secular memorial.   
The structure of the sale ensured that Bidder # 1 would be awarded 
the land.  Bidder # 1 could bid the full $35,000 and still 
demonstrate the financial capability to maintain a historic war 
memorial because the City would subsidize the cost of Bidder # 1’s 
proposed memorial by conveying the cross.  Bidder # 2 could not 
compete successfully with Bidder # 1:  If Bidder # 2 matched 
Bidder # 1’s bid, then Bidder # 2 could not demonstrate the 
financial capability to maintain a historic war memorial, because all 
of Bidder # 2’s resources would have been dedicated to the bid 
price, and none would have been reserved to fund removal of the 
cross and construction of a new memorial. Alternatively, Bidder # 2 
could reserve the money needed to remove the cross and construct 
                                                          
 123. Id. at 491. 
 124. See supra notes 106–113 and accompanying text (describing the exceptions to 
the Seventh Circuit’s presumption test). 
 125. See, e.g., Annunziato v. New Haven Bd. of Aldermen, 555 F. Supp. 427, 433 
(D. Conn. 1982) (finding the sale of public land to a church was a violation of the 
Establishment Clause where the church paid only $1 as consideration and the 
transaction amounted to nothing more than a gift). 
 126. See Paulson v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that, independent of procedural regulations in conveying publicly owned land,  
the city created an economic incentive to perpetuate a sectarian symbol in violation 
of the California Constitution). 
  
146 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:129 
the new memorial.  But that option would eliminate Bidder # 2 
from the process, because Bidder # 2’s bid in that instance would 
fall below the minimum acceptable bid.127 
As demonstrated by the example above, seemingly benign terms 
such as the price or method of bidding put in place as part of the 
conveyance could manipulate the outcome.128 
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the identity of the purchaser is 
similarly inadequate.  In that court’s estimation, a “straw purchaser” is 
one who allows the government to “continu[e] to exercise duties of 
ownership” after the conveyance of land.129  In attaching conditions to 
the preservation of a court-decreed unconstitutional religious symbol, 
the Veterans of Foreign Wars—the recipient of land under the Buono 
transfer—essentially becomes an extension of the government.130  
While title to the parcel indicates private ownership, the true 
operator of the site is indistinguishable from pre-transfer conditions.  
The mere “form” of a transaction should not blind courts from 
potential unconstitutional effects like the advancement of religious 
speech. 
B. The Land Transfer Employs Property Designations to Create a Perception 
of State Endorsement that Evades a Constitutional Guarantee 
Aside from its superficial terms, the government’s proposed 
transfer has the effect of perpetuating a constitutional wrong through 
three principal means.  First, the transfer does not remedy the 
appearance of continuing government action.  Second, the transfer 
permits the government to continue its tradition of masking control 
over property in order to obviate constitutional rights.  Finally, 
permitting such transactions to take place could produce the 
questionable policy of inviting private individuals and organizations 
to carve out pieces of public land for special interests.  When 
confronted with a remedy that fails to look beyond the face value of 
                                                          
 127. Id. 
 128. Notably, the Mojave transfer did not even go so far as to employ a bidding 
process, but rather merely effected an exchange between the original party 
responsible for the cross’s construction—the Veterans of Foreign Wars—and the 
cross’s current curator.  Lake, supra note 81, at 1B. 
 129. Freedom from Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 492  
(7th Cir. 2000). 
 130. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:  SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. d (2000) 
(describing the Constitution’s general inapplicability to private conveyances except 
for those situations in which servitudes require the performance of “public 
functions” or in which the enforcement by a court could constitute government 
endorsement of unconstitutional servitudes). 
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title ownership, the Supreme Court should strike down any such 
backdoor attempts at circumvention. 
1. The land transfer and the perception of continuing state action 
Taken together, the terms of the land transfer and the 
government’s active role in maintaining the religious symbol even 
after the transaction exemplify continuing state action.  Title to the 
land on which the cross stands does not exonerate the government 
actor because the setting of the symbol may still give the impression 
of being part of government land.131  The Establishment Clause 
prohibits a perception of government endorsement of religious 
symbols affixed to state land.132 
The private beneficiary of the land transfer performs functions 
normally under the umbrella of the state.133  The terms of the 
conveyance include a condition that the land, as well as the replica 
cross and commemorative plaque purchased with government 
funds,134 be maintained as a memorial by the recipient, the Veterans 
of Foreign Wars.135  The Mojave cross is a memorial site in the middle 
of an area that has been government property for most of the 
twentieth century.136  By exercising control over this land, the 
government—not the private party—is the entity to whom the cross’s 
message is attributed.137 
                                                          
 131. See Jordan C. Budd, Cross Purposes:  Remedying the Endorsement of Symbolic 
Religious Speech, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 183, 233, 238 (2004) (arguing that proposed land 
transfer remedies require greater scrutiny than removal of religious displays due to 
the potential for abuse in perpetuating government endorsement). 
 132. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 868–69 (2005) (remarking that 
the reasonable observer would find the counties’ initial postings of the Ten 
Commandments replica tablets as emphasizing the text’s religious message). 
 133. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (“The service rendered even by 
a private park of this character is municipal in nature.”). 
 134. Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for 
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137(c), 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79 (2002) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 
§ 410aaa-56 note (2006)). 
 135. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87,  
§ 8121(a), (e), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100 (2003) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 note 
(2006)). 
 136. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and 
reh’g denied by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom., Salazar v. Buono, 
129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (explaining that the National Park Service received the 
Preserve as part of a land transfer in 1994 from the Bureau of Land Management); 
see also Brown, supra note 1 (noting that in 1934 the Bureau of Land Management 
controlled the land on which the Mojave cross stands). 
 137. See Pleasant City Grove v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1141 (2009) (Souter, J., 
concurring) (commenting that, where a government entity purports to maintain a 
monument, the entity will be presumed to be engaging in government speech). 
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Evans v. Newton,138 a leading Supreme Court case in defining 
“public function,” helps illustrate the impact of continuing municipal 
maintenance after a transfer in title.139  Evans involved the transfer of 
a tract of land from a United States Senator to the city of Macon, 
Georgia.140  As a condition of the transfer, the parcel was to be 
controlled by the city and used as a park “for white people only.”141  
Facing opposition from members of the community, the city removed 
itself as trustee of the property but continued its routine maintenance 
of the property just as it had when it was under public control.142   
The Court held that the existence of a segregated park that benefited 
from city involvement was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment because the mere transfer of title from public to private 
hands did not instantly erase an established tradition of government 
involvement in the property.143 
Like the city of Macon in Evans, the federal government has played 
a key part in maintaining the Mojave Preserve for all visitors to 
enjoy.144  In Evans, the city manicured and cleaned the segregated 
park both before and after its time as trustee.145  Similarly, the 
government used funds to purchase a sign and replica cross and 
stipulated the methods of the Mojave Cross’s continued 
preservation.146  Specifically, the proposed transfer provides that the 
Secretary of the Interior continue oversight regarding land use 
through the use of reversionary rights.147  Just as the segregated park 
                                                          
 138. 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
 139. See id. at 301 (holding that, where the municipality has maintained a city 
park, the city park remains intertwined in its control and is therefore still subject to 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 140. Id. at 297. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 297–98, 301. 
 143. Id. at 301. 
 144. See id. (stating that a park is more like a police department than a social club 
in that it traditionally serves an entire community). 
 145. See id. (recounting that there has been “no change in municipal maintenance 
and concern” over the park since the exchange of trustees took place). 
 146. See Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for 
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137(c), 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79 (2002) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 
§ 410aaa-56 note (2006)) (“The Secretary of the Interior shall use not more  
than $10,000 of funds . . . to acquire a replica of the original memorial plaque and 
cross . . . .”). 
 147. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87,  
§ 8121(e), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100 (2003) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 note 
(2006)) (“The conveyance . . . shall be subject to the condition that the recipient 
maintain the conveyed property as a memorial . . . .  If the Secretary determines that 
the conveyed property is no longer being maintained as a war memorial, the 
property shall revert to the ownership of the United States.”); see also Hampton v. 
City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320, 322–23 (5th Cir. 1962) (finding “complete present 
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in Evans did not shed its unconstitutional character through transfer, 
the mere substitution of ownership from public to private parties 
does not automatically free the land on which the cross stands of its 
public nature.148 
Of course, the Court has not categorically stated that a private 
party maintaining land in a public park always constitutes a quasi-
public actor.149  The Court has, in fact, narrowed the definition of 
public function in state parks significantly.150  Because the Buono 
transfer contains reversionary language comparable to those cases in 
which there is no change in government involvement following the 
transfer of ownership, it falls within the scope of imputing “public 
function” to private parties in the context of public parks.151 
Aside from oversight through maintenance over supposedly 
conveyed land, “public function” may also exist due to a lack of 
physical separation between public and private property.152   
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City 
Corp.153 provides an example of effective separation of the public and 
private arenas. 
                                                          
control” by a municipality where a reversionary clause was included in deeds to 
segregated golf clubs). 
 148. See Pleasant City Grove v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1133 (2009) (remarking 
that public parks are often closely associated with the government unit that owns the 
land); Evans, 382 U.S. at 302 (holding that, regardless of title, the “public character” 
of a park prohibits racial segregation under the Fourteenth Amendment);  
see also United States v. Mississippi, 499 F.2d 425, 430–32 (5th Cir. 1974) (invalidating 
a lease of an educational facility from a municipal body to a private segregated 
school on the basis that government aid may not be used to further racially 
discriminatory measures such as the provision of a non-unitary school); Hampton, 304 
F.2d at 323 (finding that there is continuing state action when a city sells golf courses 
to private parties with reversionary provisions requiring that the private owner 
continue operating the facility with the same racially discriminatory conditions as 
previously required under government ownership). 
 149. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159 n.8 (1978) (doubting 
whether Evans was intended to extend to all situations where private parties operate 
parks for recreational purposes). 
 150. See id. (advocating for the position that Evans applies where there is no 
change in government involvement in the land after the transfer). 
 151. See Hampton, 304 F.2d at 320–21 (rejecting terms of a transfer permitting 
reversion of a segregated golf course to the government “if said property be not so 
maintained [as a golf course] or . . . converted to other use, said property will 
immediately revert to the [government], its successor or assigns, and it shall be lawful 
for the [government], its successors or assigns to re-enter and repossess said property 
and thereafter to peaceably hold and enjoy the same as if this conveyance had not 
been made”). 
 152. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1946) (commenting that, in a 
town owned by a private corporation, an area designated as a “business block” is 
indistinguishable from other sections because it is openly accessible to all who 
choose to pass through). 
 153. 425 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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Utah Gospel Mission involved a controversy over a city’s sale of a 
portion of a street to the Church of Latter-Day Saints.154  As part of an 
easement, the city reserved rights to public access, but also provided 
that the church could restrict expression on the parcel.155  After a 
legal challenge prohibiting the repression of speech on the street,156 
the city sold the easement to the church.157  When challenged again 
on the grounds that the church-owned street and plaza constituted a 
public forum and could not, therefore, have speech restrictions,  
the Tenth Circuit held that the church could restrict speech and was 
not a state actor.158  Notably, the court reasoned that the church’s 
clear delineation of its parcel from surrounding public streets and 
sidewalks distinguished the case from past situations where the public 
function principle had previously applied.159  The court also reasoned 
that because the city was not responsible for maintenance or other 
control of the street, the church’s sole ownership precluded any 
claim of public function.160 
The parcel at issue in Buono is neither clearly delineated from 
other public spaces, nor solely under the control of the private 
party.161  While the “objective attributes” of the area covered under 
the easement in Utah Gospel Mission were distinguishable from the city 
streets surrounding it,162 the cross in question stands in the middle of 
the Mojave desert, without separation from the land around it.163  
Without physical separation of public and private land, there is a 
greater potential for government endorsement.164  Here, continuing 
                                                          
 154. Id. at 1252. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 1253.  See generally First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp.,  
308 F.3d 1114, 1131 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that speech could face content-based 
restrictions on the Plaza, which was found to constitute a public forum). 
 157. Utah Gospel Mission, 425 F.3d at 1253. 
 158. Id. at 1255. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87,  
§ 8121(a)–(e), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100 (2003) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 note 
(2006)) (establishing the government’s control over property). 
 162. See Utah Gospel Mission, 425 F.3d at 1252–53 (noting the Plaza’s unique 
walking surface and elaborate structures around its points of entry). 
 163. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2007),  
amended and reh’g denied by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom.,  
Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (describing the location and setting of the 
cross and noting the lack of a sign). 
 164. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 776 (1995) 
(advocating the posting of a sign disclaiming government sponsorship of a cross 
erected by the Ku Klux Klan because of the fear that the symbol’s proximity to 
government property could suggest government approval of a religious message); 
Budd, supra note 131, at 240 (noting the importance of visible demarcation by 
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government action exists due to the existence of reversionary 
language in the terms of transfer and the failure to separate the 
transferred land through physical delineation of the parcel. 
2. The masking of government actors using property concepts 
When remedying a violation of a constitutional right, the net effect 
cannot circumvent the protection afforded by the courts.165  Though 
the form of the proposed transaction in Buono removes the 
government from legal ownership, government action persists in 
substance, as does the expression of a patently religious symbol on 
what is perceived to be public land.166  At its core, the Buono transfer 
represents the potential for evasion of an adequate constitutional 
remedy.167  Courts should take note of these unanticipated 
unconstitutional effects when the government manipulates property 
as part of a proposed remedy. 
Faulty desegregation plans, the silver platter doctrine, and the 
Mojave land transfer demonstrate similar blending of property and 
government control.  Through each process, the government, by 
exerting a measure of control over a supposedly independent party,168 
has permitted the use of property for an unconstitutional purpose.169  
In Griffin, county officials closed public property and replaced it with 
                                                          
stating that “[i]t does little good to sell property underlying a religious symbol if the 
change in ownership is apparent only to those who conduct a title search”). 
 165. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 215 n.7 (1960) (noting the “basic 
incongruity in a rule which excludes evidence unlawfully obtained by federal officers, 
but admits in the same court evidence unlawfully obtained by state agents”  
(citing People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 588 (N.Y. 1926))). 
 166. See supra Part II.B.1 (outlining the weaknesses in looking solely at the 
superficial terms of the transaction without investigating the potential for continuing 
government action). 
 167. See Budd, supra note 131, at 237 (describing the various doctrinal situations in 
which courts scrutinize land transfers for potential constitutional violations);  
cf. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964) (stating that the object of 
state action in closing the public school system must be constitutional, and 
opposition to desegregation does not qualify as such); Elkins v. United States, 364 
U.S. 206, 215 (1960) (commenting that it would be “curiously ambivalent” to 
differentiate between unconstitutionally seized evidence when brought by federal 
agents as compared to state agents in contravention of Fourth Amendment 
protections). 
 168. See Griffin, 377 U.S. at 222–24 (cataloguing Prince Edward County’s efforts in 
funding segregated private schools by providing, inter alia, busing and tuition grants 
to students); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 221–22 (acknowledging that the silver platter 
doctrine invites federal officials to “tacitly . . . encourage state officers in the 
disregard of constitutionally protected freedom”). 
 169. See Griffin, 377 U.S. at 231 (determining that Prince Edward County’s funding 
and operation of segregated private schools was administered for the sole purpose of 
“ensur[ing] . . . that white and colored children . . . would not, under any 
circumstances, go to the same school”); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 209–10 (noting the rise of 
the silver platter doctrine and the past use of property seized by state officials in 
federal prosecutions). 
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government-subsidized segregated schools.170  In the context of the 
silver platter doctrine, state actors deprived individuals of private 
property and used this illegally-obtained evidence to assist federal 
prosecutors build their cases in federal court.171  While the two 
contexts address different types of property, in substance they 
resemble situations in which a government body manipulated parties 
not constrained by the same constitutional limitations to hide its 
continued, unlawful involvement.172  Courts should take note of each 
of these historical constitutional struggles because the manipulation 
of public and private property presents itself again as part of the 
Mojave land transfer. 
Additionally, the Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection 
contexts each demonstrate the Court’s focus on the overall effects of 
the government’s proposed remedies rather than mere form or 
process.  Following Brown, the Court has often used firm language in 
requiring the immediate institution of unitary school systems,173 and 
made strong efforts to weed out those parties whose programs failed 
constitutional muster.174  Similarly, in Griffin, the Court looked 
beyond the county’s plan to give aid to private schools and resolved 
that the program had the unconstitutional effect of depriving free 
public education for invidious purposes.175 
                                                          
 170. See supra notes 46–56 and accompanying text (tracking the significance of 
Griffin in the context of faulty desegregation plans). 
 171. See supra notes 57–79 and accompanying text (discussing the rise and fall of 
the doctrine and the role of Elkins in providing a declaration that illegally seized 
property could not be used as an instrument of the prosecution).  Admittedly, the 
silver platter doctrine may be distinguished from the present situation because it 
involves the federal government's manipulation of another government body, rather 
than a private citizen.  However, the identity of the manipulated party makes little 
difference.  Constitutional requirements allowed the use of property seized by state 
officials in federal court because state officials were not bound by the same legal 
limitations as their federal counterparts.  Thus, even though each party in this 
context may be classified as a government actor, the Constitution imposed on them 
crucially different limitations.  This differential treatment permitted the federal 
government's circumvention of the exclusionary rule.  See supra notes 62–64 and 
accompanying text (outlining the exception to Weeks’s exclusionary rule). 
 172. See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the government’s continuing presence on 
the conveyed property); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1254 (8th ed. 2004) 
(defining private property as property “over which the owner has exclusive and 
absolute rights”) (emphasis added). 
 173. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968) (“The transition 
to a unitary, nonracial system of public education was and is the ultimate end to be 
brought about . . . .”). 
 174. See KLARMAN, supra note 45, at 102–03 (recounting that in 1968 the Court 
removed the power of evaluating desegregation plans from the parties themselves 
and directed courts to gauge compliance based on the actual quantity of black 
children attending previously segregated schools). 
 175. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231–32 (1964) (declaring that 
the school board’s plan to close public schools and provide aid for private schools 
was enacted for the sole purpose of perpetuating racial segregation). 
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The lineage of cases tracking the demise of the silver platter 
doctrine similarly exemplifies the Court’s close focus on assuring that 
the purpose of a remedy continues to be served.176  The silver platter 
doctrine had the effect of permitting the use of illegally seized 
property in federal court that would not be admissible evidence had 
federal agents performed the original seizure.177  Thus, regardless of 
the true identity of the violator, a remedy for a constitutional 
violation like that in Buono must erase the infringement on the 
complainant’s rights not just partially but completely.178  Because the 
injured party retains the impression that there is government 
endorsement of religion, the mere change in title ownership does 
nothing to fully and effectively correct the government’s 
constitutional wrong.179 
The substitution of actors in the Buono transfer is similar to that in 
the silver platter doctrine because in practice each allows prohibited 
government action to persist as long as it is masked by different 
actors.180  This trend of cloaking a constitutional violation in a 
“private” identity continues in Griffin’s desegregation context.181   
Like a cross on a small parcel of land that appears to be government-
owned, the effect of the county’s action was a segregated public 
school system.182  By examining potential unconstitutional effects, 
courts should take notice that the freedom from government 
endorsement of religion cannot be so easily avoided through the 
mere manipulation of property ownership. 
                                                          
 176. See supra notes 57–79 and accompanying text (tracking the history of the 
constitutional loophole in the Court’s original distinction between federal and state 
officials and the succeeding cases that worked to assure the exclusionary rule applied 
to unreasonable searches by any government official). 
 177. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 215 (1960) (acknowledging the 
unintended result of the silver platter doctrine while recognizing that “[t]o the 
victim it matters not whether his constitutional right has been invaded by a federal 
agent or by a state officer” (citation omitted)). 
 178. See Budd, supra note 131, at 215 (citing Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism 
and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 914 (1999)) (warning that 
remedies falling short of completely curing a constitutional injury may aggravate 
harm by rendering the original court ruling more of a request than an order). 
 179. See Budd, supra note 131 at 237–38 (noting the connection between 
perceived religious endorsement and state action as part of a land sale). 
 180. See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 32–33 (1927) (“[T]he court must be 
vigilant to scrutinize the attendant facts with an eye to detect and a hand to prevent 
violations of the Constitution by circuitous and indirect methods.”). 
 181. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964) (finding that 
desegregation in publicly funded private schools in a county where the public school 
system had been closed resulted in the functional equivalent of a public segregated 
school system). 
 182. Id. at 232. 
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3. Carving up the commons:  The slippery slope on Sunrise Rock 
Additionally, the government action in Buono provides an implicit 
invitation to engage in similar conduct that could have unfortunate 
policy implications.  Any entity desirous of erecting a permanent 
religious symbol on public land would have what amounts to a  
court-established right to a piece of the commons.183  Governments 
would then need to determine the size of each particular group’s plot 
and also become involved in the inevitable disputes over the relative 
sizes of each group’s piece of public land.184  Also, even if the 
government were to appease a broad range of groups through 
various land sales, it could run afoul of establishing a preference for 
believers over non-believers.185 
These potential scenarios directly contradict the Supreme Court’s 
recent express disapproval of using public parks as a mosaic of 
expression through symbols and monuments.  In Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum,186 the Court looked to the potential for abuse in refusing to 
allow a religious group to erect a monument in a public park.187  
Officials of Pleasant Grove City, Utah rejected a religious 
organization’s request to build a monument containing the Seven 
Aphorisms of Summum.188  Though the park in question featured 
eleven other displays, including a Ten Commandments monument, 
the City denied the organization’s request because the proposed 
construction was neither privately donated nor did it reflect part of 
                                                          
 183. See Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1013 (W.D. Wis. 2004), 
rev’d, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that the sale of public land exacerbates an 
Establishment Clause violation through communicating to non-believers that a 
municipality is willing to erect a religious display and alter the composition of a 
public park to insure that the symbol does not have to share its space with other 
expressive displays). 
 184. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 792 (1995) 
(Souter, J., concurring) (“By allowing [the] government to encourage what it cannot 
do on its own, the proposed per se rule [that no government endorsement arises from 
private religious expression] would tempt a public body to contract out its 
establishment of religion . . . to exhibit what the government could not display 
itself.”). 
 185. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (observing the First 
Amendment’s historical need for “neutrality between religion and religion, and 
between religion and nonreligion” (emphasis added) (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 
330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947))). 
 186. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
 187. See id. at 1138 (presenting the potential choice of a viewpoint-neutral 
government entity between a multitude of statues and displays in a public park, or 
the forced removal of each existing expressive monument). 
 188. Id. at 1127.  For more information on the Summum tradition and the 
meaning of the Seven Aphorisms, see generally Summum—Sealed Except to the 
Open Mind, http://www.summum.us (last visited Sept. 28, 2009) (discussing the 
underlying philosophy of Summum and the Seven Summum Aphormisms). 
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the municipality’s history.189  In ruling for the City, the Court 
distinguished between the expression of speakers and monuments in 
a public park by emphasizing the enduring nature of the latter’s 
message.190  The Court found it “hard to imagine” a system that 
permitted the installation of any symbol desirous of its slice of the 
public pie.191  A framework that permits a multitude of monuments 
through the piecemeal distribution of the commons would also 
undoubtedly raise the Court’s suspicions.192 
Finally, should the government be fortunate enough to avoid issues 
of religious preference and neutrality altogether, the practical result 
could yield unintended consequences.  For example, a petition 
calling for a transfer of land to permit the placement of a wooden 
swastika193 on public land would surely elicit a very different reaction 
than the cross in Buono.  These hypothetical situations illustrate that 
carving out public lands into private parcels to appease particular 
religious groups—while at the same time conflicting with Supreme 
Court doctrine—could invite religious tension rather than alleviate 
it.194 
III. REPLACING THE LAND TRANSFER PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY WITH 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE  
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit’s 
present presumptive test does not appropriately take into account the 
potential perception of government endorsement where land on 
which a recognized violation occurs is sold to a private party.195   
In order to assure that the government fully complies with an 
injunction prohibiting the establishment of religion, courts should 
adopt a test that examines not only the form of such transactions  
                                                          
 189. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129–30. 
 190. See id. at 1137 (stating that monuments permanently monopolize public land, 
while speakers eventually tire and depart the space, taking their message with them). 
 191. Id. 
 192. See id. (stipulating that public parks were only meant to accommodate a 
limited selection of permanent displays). 
 193. See Hemant G. Padhya, Information and Origin of Hindu Swastika, Mar. 15, 
2005, http://www.ivarta.com/columns/OL_050314.htm (describing the swastika as a 
symbol of the “endless nature of God” representing truth, compassion, tolerance and 
happiness in the ancient Vedic Dharma and Hindu Dharma traditions). 
 194. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 612–13 (1989) 
(invalidating the display of a crèche on public grounds based on the Constitution’s 
required “respect for religious diversity” in permitting public displays). 
 195. See supra Part II.A (discussing the shortcomings of the Seventh Circuit’s 
presumption). 
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(as originally expressed in Freedom from Religion Foundation), but also 
the potential for an unconstitutional effect.196 
A. The Use of Lemon and a Response to Its Critics 
In order to evaluate whether the transfer has a constitutional 
purpose and effect, courts should return to one of its original sources 
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Though Lemon has its critics 
on and off the Court,197 this multi-pronged approach could more 
adequately address constitutional concerns by looking not only at the 
purpose of the government’s proposed remedy but also at the 
constitutional effect of such action.198  By asking whether a land 
transaction satisfies a valid secular purpose, courts could effectively 
ferret out transactions that blatantly fail to accomplish a secular 
purpose.199  Furthermore, by analyzing the potential effect of the 
transaction, courts could more adequately address concerns 
regarding an unconstitutional perception of government 
endorsement.200 
                                                          
 196. See Freedom from Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 
(7th Cir. 2000) (“[A]dherence to a formalistic standard invites manipulation.”);  
see also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 48 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) 
(commenting that, for judges and prosecutors desirous of admitting illegally 
obtained evidence into court, “[c]ompliance with the Bill of Rights betokens more 
than lip service”).  Granted, Freedom from Religion Foundation does include language 
that expresses the need to look to the “substance” of a transaction as well as its form.  
203 F.3d at 491.  However, the test’s presumption in favor of the government 
hamstrings any effect of such language on the practical application of the test.   
See supra Part II.A (describing the superficial nature on which the land transaction is 
evaluated under the Seventh Circuit’s test). 
 197. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 890 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (noting that a majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court had 
previously expressed dissatisfaction with the principle of neutrality that the Lemon 
test embodies); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (finding the three prongs 
of Lemon to be “no more than helpful signposts”).  See generally infra notes 201–203 
and accompanying text. 
 198. See supra notes 17–37 and accompanying text (following Lemon’s focus as it 
has evolved since its original use); supra notes 204–206 and accompanying text 
(same). 
 199. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (holding that a Kentucky 
law requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in classrooms was for the 
unconstitutional purpose of imposing religious doctrine on students); Staley v. 
Harris County, 461 F.3d 504, 514–15 (2006) (finding that a county had a 
predominantly religious purpose for erecting a monument of an open bible 
memorializing a prominent philanthropist in front of a Texas Courthouse). 
 200. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Establishment Clause forbids a State to hide 
behind the application of formally neutral criteria and remain studiously oblivious to 
the effects of its actions.”).  See generally Budd, supra note 131, at 215–20 (discussing 
various approaches to the remedial inquiry with respect to Establishment Clause 
violations). 
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Opponents of Lemon will undoubtedly be quick to point out its 
faults.  For example, critics contend that judges can manipulate the 
test’s malleable terms to their individual points of view,201 while others 
believe Lemon fails to address all the complexities of our 
Constitution’s treatment of religion.202  Still others claim it misses the 
meaning of the anti-establishment guarantee by being too focused on 
government neutrality.203 
While there may be some merit to these claims, the Court’s 
inconsistent criticisms of the test have themselves produced a 
haphazard application.204  For all the controversy surrounding its use, 
Lemon has not been expressly overruled and remains a common 
                                                          
 201. See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 14, at 156 (stating that the Lemon test of “excessive 
entanglement” is a completely relative term that has no readily distinguishable 
meaning). 
 202. See, e.g., Ronald Thiemann, The Constitutional Tradition:  A Perplexing Legacy, in 
LAW & RELIGION:  A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 345, 357–59 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 
2000) (noting that, like other tests, the Lemon test errantly considers the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause to be separate doctrines rather 
than intermingled legal principles); William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter with 
Equality?:  An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193, 194 (2000) (describing religion clause 
jurisprudence as so muddled that “[e]very new case accepted for argument presents 
the very real possibility that the Court might totally abandon its previous efforts and 
start over”). 
 203. PETER K. ROFES, THE RELIGION GUARANTEES 41 (2005) (describing Justice 
Rehnquist’s perspective that the Lemon test should permit the government’s use of 
religious institutions to achieve secular means rather than maintaining a strict 
withdrawal from all religious activity). 
 204. Compare McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 861–62 (2005) (focusing 
on the “purpose” inquiry of the Lemon test as applied to the religious symbol’s 
context), with Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686–87 (2005) (denying the Lemon 
test any constitutional significance when dealing with ambiguously identified 
“passive” monuments like that in question and instead evaluating the symbol under a 
history and tradition analysis).  For a colorful commentary on Lemon’s continued 
existence, one need look no further than the exchange between Justice White and 
Justice Scalia in a 1993 case in which Scalia compared the test to a creature in a 
horror movie: 
The secret of the Lemon test’s survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill.  It is 
there to scare us . . . when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to 
return to the tomb at will . . . .  When we wish to strike down a practice it 
forbids, we invoke it . . . ; when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids,  
we ignore it entirely. . . .  Such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping 
around, at least in a somnolent state; one never knows when one might need 
him. 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  Justice White acted as an advocate for 
this supposed “monster” in the majority opinion: 
While we are somewhat diverted by Justice Scalia’s evening at the cinema,  
we return to the reality that . . . Lemon, however frightening it might be to 
some, has not been overruled.  This case, like Corporation of Presiding Bishop of 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, presents no occasion to do so.   
Id. at 395 n.7 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 
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starting point for analysis.205  Moreover, the Court’s application of 
Lemon in recent decisions indicates that the test is not merely waiting 
to be overruled, but rather is an active member of Establishment 
Clause doctrine.206 
The use of Lemon in this scenario also provides the additional 
benefit of uniformity.  Subjecting the proposed land transfer to one 
test would provide lower courts with a framework connecting the 
analysis of the remedy to the infraction it claims to correct.207   
This uniformity in analysis would be a rarity in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, particularly with regard to religious symbols.208 
B. Applying Lemon to the Mojave Cross 
The first prong of the Lemon test requires that a government 
enactment have a valid secular purpose.209  Second, Lemon requires 
that the relevant state action neither advance nor inhibit religion.210  
Finally, the proposed government action may not foster “excessive 
entanglement” with religion.211  In more recent applications of the 
Lemon test, the Court has blended the final two prongs together.212  
Regardless of the grouping of its prongs, it is clear that the Lemon test 
targets the two necessary inquiries in light of our discussion of the 
                                                          
 205. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 668–69 (2002) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (claiming that the Lemon test is a “central tool” in the Establishment 
Clause analysis relating to school vouchers); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 63 n.3 
(1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (declaring that Lemon has been used in many of the 
Court’s Establishment Clause cases and that stare decisis requires the continuance of 
this tradition); see also Jessica Gavrich, Comment, Constitutional Law:  Judicial 
Oversights—Inconsistency in Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 58 FLA. L. REV. 437, 444–45 
(noting that, because Van Orden merely avoided discussion of Lemon while McCreary 
County reasserted its importance, lower courts are left with confusion, but not express 
renunciation of the test). 
 206. See, e.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 864–65 (finding that the two Kentucky 
counties’ displays of the Ten Commandments in courthouses violated Lemon because 
the displays did not have a secular purpose). 
 207. See DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., REMEDIES:  PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 131, 678–79  
(3d ed. 2002) (stating that injunctive relief must safeguard legal rights without 
overprotecting). 
 208. See Budd, supra note 131, at 215–16 (noting the inconsistent methodology in 
structuring the question of remedies for religious symbols). 
 209. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–33 (1997) (explaining the 
overlap of the Lemon prongs in the context of government aid to religious groups or 
programs by stating that the factors used in assessing “entanglement” are similar to 
those used in determining an unconstitutional “effect”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (interpreting the “effects” and 
“entanglement” prongs of Lemon as safeguards against “government practice[s] 
[having] the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or 
disapproval of religion . . . whether intentionally or unintentionally”); ROFES,  
supra note 203, at 30 (tracking the evolution of the Lemon test). 
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Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments:  (1) the purpose of the 
proposed government action and (2) the effect of the transaction 
regarding both real and perceived government control of a religious 
symbol.213  As illustrated by the analysis of school desegregation plans 
and the silver platter doctrine, the use of property designations has 
led the Court to examine these same core concerns.214  Having noted 
the congruence of Lemon with the need for a secular purpose and net 
constitutional effect, we may apply the test to the Mojave land 
transfer.   
On its face, the transfer appears to have a secular purpose.215  
Concededly, the terms of the transfer make no express mention of 
Christianity or religion in general.216  However, under Lemon the 
“secular purpose” prong is evaluated by “one presumed to be familiar 
with the history of the government’s actions and competent to learn 
what history has to show.”217  In Buono, court rulings prior to the 
transfer held the cross to be a violation of the Establishment Clause,218 
and government legislation to preserve the cross took place only after 
the National Park Service announced its intention to remove the 
                                                          
 213. The inquiry into perceived endorsement in the context of religious symbols 
has previously garnered criticism.  See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 
U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (refusing to use the Establishment Clause as a “modified 
heckler’s veto” in which one individual’s misperception defeats a group’s ability to 
engage in religious practice).  In Good News Club, the school dissociated itself from a 
religious group by requiring that meetings take place after school hours and be open 
to all members of the public.  Id. at 113–14.  However, the land sale context is 
distinguishable from endorsement in Good News Club and similar cases because the 
land transfer context involves legislative action with continuing government 
oversight over land that it has supposedly completely renounced.  See supra Part II.B.1 
(explaining that even in a land transfer the monuments on the land will still be 
linked to government action). 
 214. See supra Part II.B (describing three ways the government’s proposed land 
transfer will offend the principles of the Constitution). 
 215. Cf. Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 338, 346–47  
(Or. 1976) (finding that a large concrete cross in a public park passed constitutional 
muster on the grounds that it was intended to be a memorial to war veterans). 
 216. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87,  
§ 8121(a)–(e), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100 (2003) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 note 
(2006)) (providing background on the terms of the transfer). 
 217. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005); see also Capitol Square 
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (characterizing the reasonable observer as one who is aware of the 
context in which the religious display exists). 
 218. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1073–75 (9th Cir. 2007),  
amended and reh’g denied by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom., Salazar 
v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (noting that the plaintiff, Frank Buono, filed suit in 
March of 2001 and the Central District of California entered an injunction enjoining 
the display of the cross in July 2002, while the land transfer agreement passed 
through Congress in September 2003 after the parties had been heard on appeal in 
the Ninth Circuit as part of Buono II). 
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symbol.219  Meanwhile, federal courts were in the process of hearing—
and ultimately upholding—the original injunction.220  Moreover, the 
express terms of the original agreement providing for continued 
government oversight and a reversionary interest indicating that the 
government did not intend to relinquish its interest to a private party 
but rather to ensure the preservation of the cross itself.221   
A reasonable observer could potentially view repeated attempts at 
shielding the Mojave cross from forced removal through litigation 
and legislation as the preservation of a patently religious message.222 
Even if one were to assume the government’s purpose in enacting 
the legislation was wholly secular, the land transfer has the effect of 
endorsing a patently religious symbol due to continuing government 
action and the perception of public ownership.223  The cross stands 
surrounded by public property with no means of separation.224  
Therefore, by mere observation the transfer fails to address the 
perception that the land remains under federal control.225  Such a 
                                                          
 219. See Savage, supra note 8, at A8 (explaining the ongoing dispute over the cross 
and how this issue may give the Supreme Court an opportunity to reformulate the 
law on church-state separation); see also Cart, supra note 94, at B6 (discussing the 
controversy over the cross in the Mojave National Preserve). 
 220. See supra Part II.C.2 (outlining the history of the litigation and the 
government’s legislative responses). 
 221. See Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 527 F.3d 758, 782 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(recounting the government’s various “herculean efforts” to preserve the cross);  
see also Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for 
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137(a), 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79 (2002) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 
§ 410aaa-56 note (2006)) (“The five-foot-tall white cross . . . is hereby designated as a 
national memorial commemorating United States participation in World War I and 
honoring the American veterans of that war.”); § 8137(c) (“The Secretary . . . shall 
use not more than $10,000 of funds . . . to acquire a replica of the original memorial 
plaque and cross . . . .”); § 8121(a) (providing for the land exchange while 
reinforcing the Secretary’s responsibilities under § 8137). 
 222. See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 872–73 (holding that the inclusion of 
nonreligious texts in a display featuring the Ten Commandments did not nullify the 
County’s plainly religious purpose in violation of Lemon); supra note 217 and 
accompanying text. 
 223. See, e.g., ACLU v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 
886, 891–92 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that, although the city claimed it was 
constructed for the purpose of promoting tourism, an illuminated cross in a public 
park must be removed because it impermissibly promoted religion and the 
government’s maintenance of the structure produced excessive entanglement). 
 224. See Buono v. Norton (Buono I), 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205–07 (C.D. Cal. 
2002) (noting that the cross is not surrounded by any enclosures or signs indicating 
that the cross is used for religious purposes or as a memorial to war veterans, but 
instead the symbol sits on a “natural desert environment”). 
 225. See supra notes 134–148 and accompanying text (describing the government’s 
continued involvement in the ownership and care of the cross). 
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policy that entrenches a government entity in the advancement of 
religion is impermissible.226 
CONCLUSION 
Legal doctrine concerning the display of religious symbols on 
public land has provided various tests to interpret state action and 
evaluate potential violations.  However, the question currently at issue 
is not whether the government has established religion in the past, 
but what it may do to remedy a religious display on public land that 
violates the Establishment Clause.  The Mojave land transfer 
illustrates one innovative response:  a transaction transferring title 
ownership of land containing a religious symbol from public to 
private hands.  Shrouded in plywood, the desert cross awaits the 
Supreme Court’s release from juridical purgatory. 
The Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection contexts reflect the 
need for courts to look beyond formalistic ownership-based 
categories to determine whether the proposed remedy produces 
unlawful continuing state action.  Using these doctrines as guides,  
it is apparent that the Seventh Circuit’s presumption of validity test 
fails to adequately address both the purpose and the overall effect of 
such land transfers with regard to Establishment Clause 
considerations.  Courts can remedy this incongruity by employing the 
test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.  This test would work to safeguard 
against both an outwardly religious purpose on the part of legislators, 
and the practical effect of circumventing a constitutional right 
through manipulation of formal property categories. 
More than two hundred years after Thomas Jefferson penned his 
famous letter to the Danbury Baptist Association,227 Buono v. 
Kempthorne provides the Supreme Court a chance to give Thomas 
Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor new meaning.   
The proposed property transfer brings to light both the symbolic and 
literal implications of this oft-cited analogy.  A failure to view the 
proposed remedy in its broader context could provide future 
violators with a blueprint for eluding this historic boundary. 
 
                                                          
 226. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315–16 (2000) (finding 
that a school policy calling for an elected student to deliver an “invocation” at the 
school’s football games was an act of impermissible government supervision over 
religious debate). 
   227. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 
1802) (on file with the Thomas Jefferson Papers at the Library of Congress), available 
at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/danburys.jpg. 
